Volume 3, Issue 1, Summer 2023

War in Europe and Chinese assertiveness in the Pacific provide the backdrop for this issue. Essays by Richard Thornton, Chuck Parker, and James Perry discuss the conflict in Ukraine and its implications. In two additional papers, Perry analyses US military planning prior to entry into WWII, and Thornton critiques the American political establishment’s China strategy.

Cover, Table of Contents, and Editorial Note (PDF)

The Ukraine War: Strategic Failure and Leadership Change (PDF)—Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: The fight is not over, yet Russia already has lost in a larger sense.  The invasion of Ukraine has created a resolute and well-armed enemy on Russia’s western border, an expanded and stronger NATO, and a shrunken market for Russian gas. Such strategic debacles historically have incited regime change, and this is Vladimir Putin’s likely fate—but only if the US holds firm.

Trump, NATO, and Deterrence (PDF)—F. Charles Parker IV

Abstract: The Trump administration’s European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)—including provisions for increased US Army strength in Europe—and the decision to provide lethal assistance to Kyiv have paid dividends, enabling President Biden and European allies to blunt the threat to NATO from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Commentary on “Trump, NATO, and Deterrence” (PDF)—James D. Perry

Abstract: In “Trump, NATO, and Deterrence,” F. Charles Parker IV argues that President Trump successfully pressured fellow NATO members to increase their own defense spending.  Arms expenditure data clearly bear this out, contradicting the popular narrative that the Trump administration undermined NATO and appeased Russia.  

American Pre-War Planning: The Origins of “Germany First” (PDF)—James D. Perry

Abstract: Before entering WWII, US strategic planners determined, with British concurrence, that America should make her main effort in the Atlantic and remain on the defensive in the Pacific until German defeat was assured. Washington’s decision to allocate large forces against Japan in 1942 and 1943 contravened the pre-war blueprint but was not taken in ignorance of the potential costs and risks of doing so.

Playing to Lose: The Democrat Establishment and China (PDF)—Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: Since the presidency of FDR, the Democrat-led political establishment has sought accommodation with communist rivals—first the Russians, and then the Chinese. Indeed, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Washington’s ruling class helped to build China into a great power until outsider President Trump initiated a course correction.  Biden has continued many of his predecessor’s policies, but treads softly to avert conflict with Beijing. A stronger US stance is both necessary and opportune in light of China’s dangerous and unsound belligerence.