Ed Drea is a graduate of Canisius College in Buffalo, New York. After military service in Japan and Vietnam, he received an M.A. from Sophia University in Tokyo and a Ph.D. in Modern Japanese History from the University of Kansas. He has taught at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He worked at the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. His books include MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 and In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army.

Thomas C. Hone, formerly an executive in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is an award- winning author of many papers and books on naval subjects, including American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1911-1941. He has taught at the Naval War College and the National Defense University. He is the author of the Naval Institute guide to the Battle of Midway, and is the co-author of Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919-1939, American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941, Battleship Oklahoma BB-37, and other works.

Trent Hone has written extensively on US naval doctrine and technology before and during World War II. He has written numerous articles and book chapters on naval history, including Nineteen- Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the twentieth and Early 21st Centuries; On Seas Contested: The Seven Great Navies of the Second World War; and To Crown the Waves: The Great Navies of the First World War. He is also the co-author of Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919-1939. He is a graduate of Carleton College and has spent 20 years working in the software industry. He is currently with Excella Consulting in Arlington, VA.

Peter K. Hsu is an engineer and an expert on structural and fluid dynamics, underwater explosions, and live-fire test and survivability analysis. He has written papers on the sinking of the USS Maine, the Titanic, and the Lusitania, and won an award from the Naval Institute, along with John Rodgaard and other co-authors, for a paper on the Japanese mini-sub attack on Pearl Harbor. He is an accomplished maritime artist who has created numerous ship-commissioning portraits for Arleigh Burke-class cruisers and destroyers. He is a graduate of the City College of New York, and currently works as a Senior Engineer for a defense contractor.

James D. Perry has a BA in History from Arizona State University, an MA in Security Policy Studies from George Washington University, and a PhD in History from George Washington University. He is currently a Senior Analyst for a major aerospace corporation. He is the author of numerous articles on military history, and frequently speaks at history conferences.

John A. Rodgaard (Captain, USN, retired) spent 41 years in the United States Navy, including 29 years of service as a naval intelligence officer. After retiring, he served as a civilian intelligence analyst for U.S. government agencies. His work on Japanese Midget Submarines was showcased on NOVA Science Series, “Killer Submarines of Pearl Harbor” in 2010. He is also the author of a biography of Commodore Charles Stewart, captain of the USS Constitution, and many other works. Captain Rodgaard holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in History and Political Science, a Masters in Political Science, and is a graduate of the United States Naval War College.

Mark E. Stille (Commander, USN, retired) received a B.A. in History from the University of Maryland and a M.A. from the Naval War College. He has worked in the intelligence community for over 35 years, including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff, and on several U.S. Navy ships. He is the author of over 30 books on naval warfare with a focus on the Pacific War, including books on the Pearl Harbor attack and Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku.

Professor Richard C. Thornton is a Professor of History at George Washington University. He has a B.A. from Colgate and a Ph.D. from the University of Washington. He has taught undergraduate and graduate courses at George Washington University since 1967. He is the President of the Institute for the Study of Strategy and Politics. He is the author of a four-volume history of The Reagan Revolution, The Nixon-Kissinger Years, The Carter Years, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War, The Falklands Sting, and other works.

Alan D. Zimm (Commander, USN, Retired) has degrees in Physics, Operations Research, and Public Administration/Policy Analysis from UCLA, the Naval Postgraduate School, and USC. He served in the US Navy as a nuclear power qualified surface warfare officer, and currently is an Aviation Strike Systems Analyst at the Applied Physics Laboratory. He is the author of The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions. He has been awarded the Arleigh Burke Award from the US Naval Institute and the Distinguished Citation Award from the University of Southern California.



American Strategy: The Way Forward

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

902 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 


_____________________________________________________________________________ ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

“Endgame: August 1945 in Asia and the Pacific”

A Historical Symposium and Discussion Commemorating
The 70th Anniversary of the End of the Pacific War

Thursday, 6 August 2015, 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

Burke Theater, U.S. Navy Memorial
701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004


8:30 a.m. – 9:00 a.m.       Registration and Continental Breakfast

9:00 a.m. – 9:05 a.m.       Welcome and Introduction
                                        — Richard C. Thornton

9:05 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.      American Strategy and the Asia-Pacific Endgame
                                         — James Perry                  

10:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m     Nightmares Beyond Atomic Bombs: Ending the War with Japan
                                         — Richard B. Frank                                

11:00 a.m. – 11:15 a.m.    Coffee Break

11:15 a.m. – 12:15 p.m.    Stalin’s Strategy for Ending the Pacific War
                                         — David Glantz

12:15 p.m. – 1:30 p.m.     Lunch and Remarks by Mark T. Weber, Curator,
U.S. Navy Memorial Foundation                                                

1:30 p.m. – 2:30 p.m.       The Hokkaido Myth: U.S., Soviet, and Japanese Plans
                                         for the Invasion – and Defense – of Northern Japan
                                          — D. M. Giangreco                                                                                                              

2:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.       Visualizing a Future War: Wargaming at Newport  
                                         and the Pacific War
                                         — Norman Friedman                                                                                                            

3:30 p.m. – 3:45 p.m.       Coffee Break

3:45 p.m. – 4:45 p.m.       A Succession of Miracles: Japan’s Decision to Surrender
                                         — John T. Kuehn                                                                                                                  

4:45 p.m. – 5:40 p.m.       Truman and the Pacific War Endgame
                                         — Richard C. Thornton                                                                                                          

5:40 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.       Cocktail Reception
                                         Gallery Deck, U.S. Naval Heritage Center


6 thoughts on “Events

  1. Outstanding presentation. Lots of POV but deep understanding of the issues. I believe Prof Thorntons presentation made the case.



  3. Did the US ever consider a strategy of seizing air and naval control and then blockading the South Pacific Islands so as to make prisoner of war camps of the Japanese soldiers on the islands. What was the value of these Japanese troops in the conduct of the war if they could not leave the respective islands? It would seem the amphibious landings were unnecessary as alternate island air bases could have been found or built as China is doing today. Without a adequate supply of oil Japan would not be able to conduct a war so our total emphasis should have been to concentrate our air and naval resources in stopping supplies reaching Japan and the Japanese held islands and to have rather sent the troops to the Europe Theater. US seemed in a hurry to defeat Japan quickly without considering the cost of soldiers lives when if fact with each passing day Japan was becoming weaker. I would appreciate your comments and any suggested readings which explain the military reasoning..

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