Cover, Table of Contents, and Editorial Note (PDF)

For Want of a Shoal: Yamamoto and Midway (PDF)
Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: A key factor in Japanese defeat at the Battle of Midway was the failure of pre-battle reconnaissance. Japanese long-range float planes could, if used as planned, have detected American carriers en route to their ambush positions north of Midway.

FDR’s New World Order: A Chimerical Vision (PDF)
Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: At Cairo, Tehran and Quebec, Roosevelt made mutually contradictory promises to the British, the Chinese, and the Soviets. At Yalta, FDR decided to satisfy Stalin’s strategic designs at the expense of Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek, in hopes of creating a lasting peace based on a U.S.-Soviet partnership. This was a chimerical vision.

Truman and the Pacific War End Game (PDF)
Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: President Truman did not seek to keep the Russians out of the Pacific War, which was impossible. Instead, he used the atomic bomb to prod them into it prematurely, and by bringing the war to an early end, limit their conquests. Truman acted decisively to prevent a Soviet invasion of Japan proper.

Uncertain Empire: Blaming America First (PDF)
James D. Perry

Abstract: This article critiques Uncertain Empire, a collection of essays that represent America as the instigator of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union, China, and the Third World as passive victims who merely reacted to American aggression.

Guadalcanal, Torch, and the Second Front (PDF)
James D. Perry

Abstract: In the summer of 1942, American decisions to fight in the Solomons and North Africa contradicted the official strategy of “Germany First”. Rather than invade France in 1943, Roosevelt decided to defer the Second Front until 1944 because he had not yet reached agreement with Stalin on postwar U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

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