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Elizabeth I and England's Forward Defense in the North Richard C. Thornton

England's 1560 Intervention in Scotland, "Openly and Presently"

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Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Strategic Mistake

F. Charles Parker IV

The American Political Establishment Since FDR

Richard C. Thornton

Review Articles

David B. Colley, The Folly of the Generals

James D. Perry

Pierre Asselin, Vietnam's American War

James D. Perry

Cover Image: Elizabeth I in Coronation Robes. National Portrait Gallery, Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorial Note iv

Elizabeth I and England's Forward Defense in the North

1

Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: Soon after Elizabeth Tudor acceded to the throne, French control of Scotland posed a serious threat to England's security. This essay shows how the new English queen leveraged religious, political, and military circumstances at home and abroad in preparing a defense against a potential invasion from the north.

England's 1560 Intervention in Scotland, "Openly and Presently"

59

Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: By mid-December 1559, Queen Elizabeth I determined that overt military support of Scottish Protestant rebels was necessary to oust the French and establish a friendly Scottish regime. This essay examines the execution and implications of Elizabeth's command decision to intervene directly in Scotland's religious and civil strife.

Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Strategic Mistake

113

F. Charles Parker IV

Abstract: In addition to suppressing terrorism, the combined presence of the United States, NATO and other allies in Afghanistan provided them with leverage in the contest for Central Asian mineral resources. They also benefited from the military and intelligence position vis a vis China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. Complete withdrawal surrendered significant strategic advantages based on a false impression that the cost of limited engagement was unbearable.

The American Political Establishment Since FDR

123

Richard C. Thornton

Abstract: The election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 marked the eclipse of the center-right Republican establishment that dominated American politics since the Civil War and the emergence of a center-left Democratic establishment that has permeated American politics ever since. Their national security strategy of détente with Russia and China

repeatedly failed yet withstood intermittent attempts by a few Republican administrations to change course. The coming election cycle may bring a decisive turn to a new strategy.

Review Articles

David P. Colley, The Folly of the GeneralsJames D. Perry

145

Abstract: The author examines battles in Europe in 1943 and 1944 in which Allied commanders failed to achieve conclusive victories, but he does not advance any unifying explanation for the failures. In many cases, he blames Eisenhower's character flaws. A better approach would have started with the assumption that overall strategy for WWII was conceived in Washington and decisions in Europe reflected that strategy.

Pierre Asselin, Vietnam's American War James D. Perry

153

Abstract: This book examines the conflict from the standpoint of Hanoi, portraying it as a "David versus Goliath" encounter that galvanized worldwide insurgencies. But it suffers from a fundamentally incorrect view of the American, Soviet, or Chinese role in the Vietnam war. In particular, the author downplays Soviet military aid, misrepresents the Soviets as frustrated peacemakers, and misrepresents China as unified in its revolutionary zeal to support Hanoi's conquest of the South.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This issue once again spans nearly 500 years of history, discussing problems of geo-strategy, military tactics, and politics, from the 16th century to the present.

Richard Thornton contributes two essays on the early reign of England's queen Elizabeth I, as she faced down a threat of invasion by France through Scotland. He shows how Elizabeth exploited religious division and nationalist sentiment in Scotland to weaken French control there. He then recounts her bold military intervention on the side of the Scottish rebels to defeat the French and establish a government of pro-English Scots. Throughout, Elizabeth had to carefully manage relations with King Philip II of Spain, lest he find cause to attack England, too.

A third article by Thornton returns to the influence of political establishments on American strategy, whose evolution he surveyed in the Spring 2020 issue of the Journal of Strategy and Politics. Here, he examines the dominance of a center-left, pro-détente order since the election of FDR, and the prospect that a new Republican establishment could soon take hold.

F. Charles Parker's trenchant critique of US withdrawal from Afghanistan considers it a tragic error. He enumerates the rationale for the war, and the strategic advantages accruing to the US and NATO from their engagement in Afghanistan. The execution of the retreat was deplorable, and no doubt has contributed to a loss of confidence in the United States. But in Parker's view, total abandonment of the allied position in Central Asia is of far greater negative consequence.

James Perry reviews two books, David Colley's The Folly of the Generals (2021), about missed opportunities on the battlefield to achieve a swifter conclusion of WWII in Europe; and Pierre Asselin's analysis of the Vietnam War through the lens of Hanoi, Vietnam's American War (2018). Colley discusses battles in France and Italy, as well as less familiar events in Holland, Belgium, and Alsace. He blames Eisenhower and other generals for failure to capitalize on breakthroughs but offers no unifying explanation or context. Asselin's strength is in his discussion of North Vietnam, but his book misrepresents the roles of the Soviet Union and China. An accurate strategic frame of reference would make both works more useful.

—Joanne Thornton

Assistant Editor The Journal of Strategy and Politics