



#### Editorial Note

**“The Enemy Retreats, We Pursue.” China’s Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific as a Reflection of U.S.-China Strategic Interaction**

Richard C. Thornton

**“Since Ancient Times.” China’s Maritime Claims vs. History Books and Ancient Maps**

Tri H. Pham

**Penkovsky: Genuine Defector Turned Unwitting Soviet Agent of Disinformation**

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**The Strategic Impact of the Battle of Midway**

James D. Perry

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Richard C. Thornton	
Abstract: China is mounting a multi-faceted challenge to the United States and the nations of the Western Pacific. A survey of the disputes shows that all of China’s claims originate in an exploitation of U.S. decisions over the past four decades that have eroded the post-WWII architecture.	
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Abstract: This article undertakes an exhaustive review of Chinese and Western historical resources to challenge China’s claim that its sovereignty over features in the South and East China Seas has existed “since ancient times.” A review of maps and literature dating back to the twelfth century vividly exposes the absence of evidence for Beijing’s argument.	
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Lana Robins	
Abstract: Col. Oleg Penkovsky spied for the West from April 1961 to August 1962, but he became an unwitting double agent after being betrayed by a mole in the upper echelons of American or British intelligence. Nonetheless, his defection enabled the U.S. to defuse the crises over Berlin and Soviet missile installations in Cuba.	
<b>The Strategic Impact of the Battle of Midway</b>	<b>205</b>
James D. Perry	
Abstract: The Battle of Midway was the culmination of an American strategy that began in June 1941 to prevent a Japanese attack on Russia, and foil German-Japanese cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. victory at Midway crippled Japanese naval aviation, preventing any attack by Japan on the Soviet Far East and keeping the Axis divided.	

## EDITOR'S NOTE

This third issue of the *Journal of Strategy and Politics* chronicles the evolution of China's strategic ascendancy of today, in contrast with U.S. advances during WWII and the Cold War. We are pleased to include important contributions from two guest scholars along with articles from Institute principals.

Richard Thornton's "*The Enemy Retreats, We Pursue*" examines the genesis and development of China's contemporary maritime strategy in the Western Pacific, and shows how it has been enabled by the United States' failure to support the structure it established in the peace treaty with Japan after WWII. This is not a recent phenomenon; indeed, the current situation reflects U.S. decision making over nearly 50 years.

"*Since Ancient Times*," authored by Vietnamese historian and map collector Dr. Tri H. Pham, offers a devastating challenge to the Chinese assertion of historical evidence for its claim of sovereign rights in the South and East China Seas. A review of more than 60 maps and literary sources dating back to the twelfth century demonstrates that Beijing's claims are wholly unsubstantiated. This article provides a rich complement to the July 12, 2016 finding of the tribunal that was composed at the Permanent Court of Arbitration to consider the Philippines' case against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). [Comments on this article are welcome, but they should be addressed directly to the author at \[scsdisputes@gmail.com\]\(mailto:scsdisputes@gmail.com\).](#)

Lana Robins' *Penkovsky: Genuine Defector Turned Unwitting Soviet Agent of Disinformation* recounts the events leading up to the Russian colonel's defection; his efforts to spy for the West; his exposure—probably by a mole in U.S. or British intelligence; and the Soviets' subsequent attempts to exploit him as a conduit of disinformation. His treachery was uncovered by the Soviet Union barely a month after it began. Even so, Penkovsky was able to convey information that helped the U.S. understand the true nature of the strategic weapons balance with the USSR, enabling the Kennedy Administration to thwart Soviet strategy and defuse the crises over Berlin and missiles in Cuba.

James Perry's *Strategic Impact of the Battle of Midway* portrays it as the culmination of an American strategy that began in June 1941 to prevent a Japanese attack on Russia, and to foil

German-Japanese cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Tactical antecedents included U.S. economic sanctions, reinforcement of the Philippines, and then, after Pearl Harbor, strikes against Japanese targets. The U.S. victory at Midway crippled Japanese naval aviation, preventing any attack by Japan on the Soviet Far East and keeping the Axis divided. As such, Midway represented a Second Front in the Pacific that denied Japan the opportunity to open or expand additional fronts of her own.

– Dr. James D. Perry  
Editor  
*The Journal of Strategy and Politics*